

Status report — Slovakia

Secure implementation of post-quantum cryptography
SPS Project Number: 984520
3rd meeting

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Outline

Implementation

- New versions of Bitpunch library
- Implementation of QC-MDPC codes

Research

- Timing Side-Channels on PCs
- Power SCA on microprocessor
- On invertible circulant matrices with prescribed weight

Publicity and training

Summary



Bitpunch library

- Development version:
`https://github.com/FrUh/BitPunch`
- Original version based on *A. Shoufan et. al., A Novel Processor Architecture for McEliece Cryptosystem and FPGA Platforms, 2009*
- Key generation (parametric), Encrypt, Decrypt
- Basic tests
- V1 only: Modified Pointcheval conversion (using openssl's SHA-512)



Changes in the library

MSc. thesis by F. Uhrecky:

- Code refactoring, unified convention
- New context management (mecs, code, math)
- Modular architecture (asn1, code, crypto, math, prng)
 - Ability to add new modules without significant changes (i.e. new code, conversion etc.)
- Speed optimization
- Run-time memory usage reduction (matrix operations, decryption w/ or w/o H)
- Keys import/export using ASN.1 (libtasn1)
- Reimplemented SHA-512 from PollarSSL
- Zero added to support
- Basic test environment



Test results — Memory usage

BitPunch	Memory usage [KiB]
1. v0.0.1	8 818
2. v0.0.3 wo. H	162
3. v0.0.3 w. H	362

- Used tool - valgrind massif
- Basic MECS, Adapted Pointcheval CCA2* (m = 11, t = 50)
- Key generation, encryption and decryption of one block
- Import/export key using ASN.1*
- * v0.0.3



Test results — Speed comparison

BitPunch	KeyGen [ms]	Enc [μ s]	Dec [ms]	Shared [KiB]	Static [KiB]
1. v0.0.1	866	62	3.9	64	96
2. v0.0.3 wo. H	768	48	52	92	172
3. v0.0.3 w. H	723	48	3.6	92	172

- Basic MECS (Goppa codes w/o CCA2, $m = 11$, $t = 50$)
- CPU Intel Core i5-2430M CPU @ 2.40GHz x 4
- RAM 2 x 4GB DDR3 1333MHz
- OS Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, Linux 3.13.0-49-generic



Test results — Library size

BitPunch	Shared [KiB]	Static [KiB]
1. v0.0.1 with CCA2	64**	96**
2. v0.0.3 FULL	92*	272
3. v0.0.3 FULL w/o print	68*	224
4. v0.0.3 Basic MECS w/o print	56*	208
5. v0.0.3 Basic + CCA2 w/o print	60*	212


- * + 80 for libtasn1
- ** + size of OpenSSL lcrypto (SHA-512)
- FULL - enc, dec, keygen, CCA2, ASN.1

QC-MDPC codes


- MSc. thesis by A. Gulyas: Custom SW implementation of McEliece QC-MDPC codes based on BitPunch library
- Test results with:
 $n_0 = 2, n = 9602, r = 4801, w = 90, t = 84$
- No SCA countermeasures



QC-MDPC memory consumption



QC-MDPC throughput



QC-MDPC overview

cryptosystem	Goppa wo-H	Goppa with-H	QC-MDPC	RSA
mesg.len. [kB]	0.183	0.183	0.586	0.125
PK size [kB]	100	100	0.586	0.129
SK size [kB]	3	137	0.176	0.25
mem. peak [KB]	180	378	7	8
keygen [ms]	702	703	19	33
enc/mesg [ms]	0.062	0.065	1.100	0.051
enc.thr. [KB/s]	2951	2815	533	2451
dec./mesg [ms]	60	3.5	7	1.1
dec.thr. [KB/s]	3	52	84	116

Table : Comparison of cryptosystems

Timing side-channels

- Strong dependence of execution times of Patterson's decoding algorithm on number of errors
- Evaluation of error locator polynomial
- Number of XGCD steps
- Can be exploited in various ways
- MSc. thesis by M. Klein: Development of countermeasures against timing-attacks for BitPunch


Side Channel Attacks resistance

- Original BitPunch: No SCA protection, vulnerable to various published attacks

Attack Type	t_0	t_1	Exploit type
Err.Locator Polynomial	3304830	3239563	Guess Error
Secret Permutation	140698	83	Algebraic
Syndrome Inversion	160546	95770	Algebraic

Side Channel Attacks resistance

- Original BitPunch: No SCA protection, vulnerable to various published attacks



SCA countermeasures

- Currently resistant to attack on Err.Locator Polynomial
 - Time constant multiplication in finite field
 - Time constant evaluation of polynomials
 - Evaluation of ELP \approx 2.5 times slower



SCA resistance






Figure : Evaluation of polynomials without (left) and with (right) countermeasures.

Power SCA on microprocessor

- Implementation of Bitpunch library on the STM32F407VG microcontroller integrated circuit.
- Due to limited memory size (192K) we are able to implement only 64-bit version of McEliece.



SCA resistance

- Our first experimental measurements of the power consumption suggest that are able to determine the permutation matrix by SPA.
- We decrypt all ciphertexts with HW one and save the corresponding power traces.
- These traces have a similar shape, but are mutually shifted by a time quantum, which corresponds to various positions of one-bits in the permutation matrix.
- We are able to determine the permutation matrix by sorting these power traces according to the execution time.



Step 6 of the project

Milestones:

M 6.1 Traces and recommendations for mounting efficient side-channel attacks:

- *Identification of secret permutation*
- *TODO: use power traces for timing attacks*

M 6.2 Capability to extract confidential data from experimental data:

- *Basic power traces (SPA) using Picoscope 6403*

Deliverables:

D 6.1 Aggregated data: *WIP*

D 6.2 Software for extracting secret data from experimental data:
WIP — Matlab scripts



Invertible circulant matrices with prescribed weight

- We proved that an invertible circulant binary $(n \times n)$ -matrix with $\frac{n^2}{2}$ ones exists if and only if $n \equiv 2 \pmod{4}$.
- For $n \equiv 2 \pmod{4}$, we developed an efficient method to construct a large set of invertible circulant binary $(n \times n)$ -matrices with $\frac{n^2}{2}$ ones.
- We developed an efficient method to construct a set of invertible circulant binary $(n \times n)$ -matrices with $n \times p$ ones, where p is a prime such that $\gcd(p, n) = 1$.
- We currently develop methods to construct matrices with other prescribed numbers of ones.



Publicity and Training

- March 5, 2015, Presentation at Ruhr-Universität Bochum
P. Zajac et.al.: Side-Channel Resistant Implementation of Post-Quantum Cryptography.
- Written a report about the Project to the University magazin Spectrum. This contribution clearly sends the message about the importance of post-quantum cryptography in a world-wide scale along with concise description of state of the art in the particular field. Paper is available at
`http://www.stuba.sk/new/docs//stu/informacie_o/diani_na_stu/spektrum/2015/201505.pdf`



Publicity Plan

- University of Washington, Tacoma, USA, June 2015
- 15-th Central European Conference on Cryptology, Klagenfurt, Austria, on July 8-10, 2015.
- University of Bergen, Norway, September 2015



Summary

- Implementation
 - New version of BitPunch
 - QC-MDPC implementation
- Research
 - Countermeasures against timing side-channels
 - Power side-channels on microprocessor
 - Further results for cyclic matrices
- Publicity: 1 presentation, 1 article

